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PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Neal Hoopes, Paxton M. Lewis & Amanda Black*
The role of extrinsic sources in interpreting patent claims has
been a source of debate in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The Court for years encouraged the use of extrinsic sources
such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises. The Court
abruptly changed course in 2005, however, largely repudiating its
earlier cases extolling the usefulness and reliability of extrinsic
sources. The Court justifiably worried that undue reliance on
dictionaries and other extrinsic sources subverted the role of
intrinsic evidence. The Court also detailed the shortcomings of
using extrinsic evidence to shed light on terms in patent claims,
noting that reliance on extrinsic evidence would alter the scope of
patent claims and “undermin[e] the public notice function of
patents.” The Federal Circuit was correct to hesitate before
crediting many existing extrinsic sources as universally reliable
guides to the meaning of patent claims. A patent’s specification and
prosecution history, however, often do not clarify a term sufficiently
for courts to jettison extrinsic evidence completely. There is a need
for objective sources that shed light on how a person of ordinary
skill in the art would interpret a certain term.
This Article provides an overview regarding how an emerging
tool—corpus linguistics—could fill the void. Corpus linguistics has
the capability to perform language searches in a general or
specialized database of words (corpus) to deduce the majority usage
*
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of a term. When a patent uses a word in an ordinary manner,
litigants may use a general corpus to demonstrate the term’s
meaning. When, as is most common, a patent uses a term in a
specialized scientific sense, litigants may construct an ad hoc,
specialized corpus that could include relevant patents, published
patent applications, scientific journals or treatises, or other
scientific materials. Such specialized corpora would be specific to
each subject area and would assist in determining how a specialized
term or phrase is used in publications written by and for skilled
artisans. When the intrinsic evidence is not sufficiently clear
regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret
a term, courts may turn to the next best alternative—discovering,
quantitatively, how the majority of persons of ordinary skill in the
art use that term. In this way, methods of claim construction may
more fully support the public notice function of patents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Claim construction is the requisite first step in assessing liability
in a patent infringement suit.1 The court must interpret2 the meaning
of the asserted patent claims prior to the factfinder determining
whether the accused product infringes on the asserted claims or
determining that the asserted claims are not valid.3 The claim
construction inquiry “is an objective one” that emphasizes the
importance of interpreting patent claims in context.4 The inquiry
requires the court to interpret the ordinary meaning of a claim term
as “a person of ordinary skill in the art” would have understood the
term at the time “of the effective filing date of the patent
application.”5 The claim terms must always be interpreted “in the
context of the entire patent, including the specification”6—i.e., the
intrinsic evidence. The use of extrinsic evidence is generally limited
1

Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
2
For purposes of this Article, the terms “construction” and “interpretation” are
used interchangeably in the context of patent claim construction. But see Tun-Jen
Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 546 (2013).
3
Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted).
4
Id. at 1117 (citations omitted); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–
13, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
5
Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116 (citations omitted); Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1313 (citations omitted).
6
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
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to better positioning the court to understand the patent’s context by
“‘plac[ing] itself in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art’
[when] reading the claims alongside the rest of the specification.”7
Despite the claim construction standard’s thematic emphasis on
context and objectivity, the existing extrinsic sources used to
interpret patent claims—such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
treatises—are not always inherently objective. These sources “only
tell [us] whether ‘a particular meaning is linguistically permissible,’
not whether it is ordinary.”8 When “divorced from the intrinsic
evidence [these existing extrinsic sources] risk[ ] transforming the
meaning of the claim term to the artisan into the meaning of the term
in the abstract, out of its particular context.”9 The Federal Circuit
previously recognized this risk in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,10 when the
Court cautioned against relying too heavily on extrinsic sources that
“focus[ ] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than
on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent”—
thereby altering the scope of patent claims and “undermining the
public notice function of patents.”11
The Federal Circuit was correct to hesitate before crediting
many existing extrinsic sources as universally reliable guides to the
meaning of patent claims. The technical complexities of patented
inventions often necessitate a judge—who “is not usually a person
conversant in the particular technical art involved and is not the
hypothetical person skilled in the art to whom a patent is
addressed”—to rely on, or at least review, extrinsic evidence when
construing the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent.12 The Phillips court recognized a judge’s reliance through its
continued permission for district courts “to admit and use such

7

Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
8
James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126
YALE L.J.F. 21, 23 (2016) (citation omitted).
9
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 1319, 1321 (citation omitted).
12
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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[extrinsic] evidence.”13 In other words, the court’s caution of
reliance was premised not on the conceptual value of extrinsic
sources, but on the particular risk of relying on extrinsic evidence
that lacks objective indicators of meaning when construing claim
terms within the context of the patent.14 Thus, extrinsic sources need
objective indicators of meaning that shed light on how a person of
ordinary skill in the art would interpret a claim term.
This Article proposes the use of corpus linguistics as a more
reliable extrinsic source that also supports the claim construction
standard’s emphases on context and objectivity. Corpus linguistics
is an empirical approach to “the study of language (linguistics)
through systematic analysis of data derived from large databases of
naturally occurring language (corpora, the plural of corpus, a body
of language).”15 The data arising from a linguistics corpus allows
“legal interpreters to look for meaning in the surrounding linguistic
context of an utterance” in a systematic manner and “to gain
meaningful and quantifiable insight about the range of possible uses
of a word and the frequency of its different senses.”16 To objectively
construe the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent,
litigants should use a corpus that is representative of the persons
having “ordinary skill in the art”—which may require the creation
of a specialized corpus—and analyze the resulting empirical data
based on a disclosed methodology.17 The method of choosing or
constructing the corpus and its resulting content would provide
transparency regarding a proposed construction and would be
subject to criticism through cross-examination and by opposing
counsel’s expert. In that case, a court could more confidently
conclude that each party has not proffered cherry-picked “extrinsic
13

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
Id. at 1318 (discussing the risks of each party cherry-picking the “extrinsic
evidence most favorable to its cause” from “a virtually unbounded universe of
potential extrinsic evidence” lacking objective indicators of meaning within the
context of the patent).
15
Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 261, 289 (2019).
16
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127
YALE L.J. 788, 832 (2018) (citations omitted).
17
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
14
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evidence most favorable to its cause.”18 It could subsequently
determine the ordinary meaning of patent claims without relying on
“human linguistic intuition alone”19 to weigh the credibility of
existing extrinsic sources that only define claim terms in the
abstract—i.e., avoid “the considerable task of filtering the useful
extrinsic evidence from the fluff” with only one’s subjective
intuitions about the usage and meaning of a term.20
This Article begins with an overview of patent law and the
relevant considerations that inherently influence the reliability of
claim construction and the subsequent determinations of
patentability, infringement, and invalidity in Section II. Section III
provides details of the claim construction standard and the emphasis
placed on context and objectivity in patent claim construction. Next,
this Article summarizes the shortcomings of certain extrinsic
evidence as recognized by the Federal Circuit and further discusses
the void developed from continued shortcomings of existing
extrinsic sources. Section IV proposes the use of corpus linguistics
to fill that void, provides details about the meaning and value of
corpus linguistics, and discusses how corpus linguistics will solve
several current issues recognized in patent claim construction.
Section IV also includes case studies that incorporate corpus
linguistics into claim construction. The section also discusses the
use of a general corpus to assess the meaning of terms in an
exemplary case based on a corpus linguistics analysis using a
general corpus. Finally, this Article then introduces the process of
developing a specialized corpus for an exemplary case and
highlights the potential benefits of utilizing a specialized corpus.
II. PATENT LAW BASICS
This section includes a brief background on the process of
obtaining a valid patent and on the hypothetical person standard that
applies, or influences, the patentability (obtaining a patent),
enforceability (challenging the validity of a patent), and scope
(affecting the patent infringement assessment) of patent claims. This
18

Id.
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 831.
20
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
19
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section also introduces the underlying theme of reliability that
influences the relevant considerations in the claim construction
process, which are addressed in detail in the next section, infra
Section III.
Obtaining a Valid Patent
A patent is a written document in the public record that discloses
a (presumed) patentable invention and places the public on notice
that the federal government has issued to the patent owner an
enforceable, exclusive right to make, use, offer to sell, or sell (or
authorize others to do the same) the disclosed invention for a fixed
term.21 To obtain a valid patent, the inventor must file a patent
application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),
which assesses whether the claimed invention meets the
patentability requirements during the application process.22 The
claimed invention is patentable if it constitutes: (i) a “new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof”23 that is (ii) novel—meaning
not previously “patented, described in a printed publication, or in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention”24—and (iii) not
obvious—meaning “the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would [not] have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains.”25 In addition, the patent
application must include a specification with: (i) “a written
description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or

21

35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 281.
UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ [https://
perma.cc/K86W-5NUU] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
23
35 U.S.C. § 101.
24
Id. § 102(a)(1).
25
Id. § 103.
22
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joint inventor of carrying out the invention”26 and (ii) “one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.”27
The patent application is “reviewed by [a] patent examiner[ ],
[a] quasi-judicial official[ ] trained in the law and presumed to ‘have
some expertise in interpreting the [prior art] references and to be
familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose
duty it is to issue only valid patents.’”28 The examiner “determines
the scope of claims in [the] patent application[ ]” by “giving claims
their broadest reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification
as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’”29 The
examiner then assesses the patentability of the claimed invention
based on a review of the patent application and the prior art.30 If the
examiner determines that the original claims of the patent
application are not patentable, the examiner rejects the patent
application and provides a written explanation describing the basis
for the rejection in a formal submission called an office action.31 The
patent applicant then has the opportunity to review the examiner’s
rejection—generally through a patent attorney—and may rebut the
rejection or amend the claims in light of the examiner’s rejection.32
Typically, the applicant can only amend the claims and not the
written description of the claimed invention.33 The amended claims
must therefore, in addition to the patentability requirements, find
support in the original written description in order to be an allowable
amendment.34 The applicant then submits a response to the
26

Id. § 112(a).
Id. § 112(b).
28
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted) (four alterations in original).
29
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
30
37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2019).
31
Id.
32
Id. § 1.111(a)(1).
33
Id. §§ 1.121(f)–(g).
34
In other words, if the amended claims do not find support in the original
written description, then the written description does not provide a full and exact
27
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examiner’s office action, which includes the amended claims and an
explanation as to why these amendments result in a patentable
invention.35 The office actions and responses may continue between
the applicant and the PTO until the examiner issues a final
rejection—terminating the application process—or grants the patent
application and issues a patent.36
The submissions between the applicant and the examiner during
the application process—including the patent application, the office
actions and responses, and ultimately the final rejection or issue of
allowance—become part of the public record, also known as the
“prosecution history” of an issued patent (or a rejected patent
application).37 The prosecution history represents a documented
account of the negotiations between the patentee and the federal
government.38 However, “[n]o inquiry as to the subjective intent [or
understanding] of the applicant or PTO is appropriate or even
possible in the context of a patent infringement suit.”39 This is due,
in part, to the common occurrence of there “be[ing] a significant
difference between what an inventor thinks his patented invention is
and what the ultimate scope of the claims is after allowance by the
PTO” and the fact that the government’s views “are generally not
obtainable, except as reflected in the prosecution history.”40
Moreover, the subjective intent of the negotiating parties to the
patent’s issuance is also irrelevant because a patent constitutes a
“public instrument[ ] [that] may create liability in third persons who
were not participants in . . . the PTO proceedings,” i.e., the patent
application process.41

description of the claimed invention, as required under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), and
therefore the claimed invention is not patentable under the statutory requirements
for patentability.
35
37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2019).
36
Id. § 1.113.
37
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
38
Id.
39
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted).
40
Id. at 985–86 (citations omitted).
41
Id. at 987.
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The Public Notice Requirement and the PHOSITA Standard
The issued patent represents a federal grant to the patentee of
temporally-limited monopoly rights that are enforceable against the
public.42 Congress authorized the grant of these enforceable
monopoly rights over an invention through its constitutional power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”43 and
delegated some of this power to the PTO to individually grant those
rights if the invention met the statutory provisions regarding
patentability.44 The limited monopoly rights are offered in exchange
for the public disclosure of the claimed invention as a way to
encourage the sharing of valuable ideas that will result in continued
inventive progress. This exchange has sometimes been
characterized as a contract between the federal government and the
inventor,45 where the nature of the exchange is one that benefits both
parties to the “contract.”46 However, the effect of this exchange is to
give the patent owner the exclusive authority to control and enforce
its monopoly rights against nonparties to the “contract”—who did
not participate in the creation or refinement of the “contract’s”
language—for a fixed term.47 The patent must therefore provide the
public with sufficient notice to understand what it can and cannot do
in order for the patentee to hold valid and enforceable monopoly
rights—similar to the enforceability of a statute against the public.48
42

See id. (acknowledging the public’s inability to participate in the patent
application process despite the creation of potential liability for the public through
the government’s grant of a patent application).
43
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
44
See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
45
See, e.g., Markman, 52 F.3d at 984; Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v.
CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s Fantastic Adventure into Section 101 Abstract
Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 4–5 (2015).
46
See generally MAVIS FOWLER, THE LAW OF PATENTS 8–9 (1996) (describing
the two main purposes of the patent system as protecting an inventor through the
grant of a patent and promoting the progress of science through public disclosure
of the invention).
47
35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 154(a)(2).
48
Markman, 52 F.3d at 984–87 (concluding that claim construction is more
analogous to statutory interpretation than contract interpretation because “both of
these public instruments [that is, statutes and patents] may create liability in third
persons who were not participants in the legislative process or the PTO
proceedings”).
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This means that the patent must describe the claimed invention in a
manner that enables “competitors . . . to ascertain to a reasonable
degree the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude” after reviewing
“the patent and prosecution history . . . and applying established
rules of construction to the language of the patent claim in the
context of the patent.”49 This standard is an objective one that is
informed by “a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention” (“PHOSITA”).50
The PHOSITA serves as “an objective baseline from which to
begin” construing the meaning of patent claims,51 assessing whether
a claimed invention is obvious,52 and ensuring sufficient disclosure
of information to enable others to make and use a claimed
invention.53 The standard interweaves itself through the patent
system by applying to both pre- and post-grant proceedings, which
creates a more consistent and predictable application of patent law.54
For example, claim construction precedes both the patentability
determination in a patent application process and the invalidity
determination in a patent infringement suit, where both
determinations are informed by the meaning of the claim and apply
the same statutory provisions.55 However, the contributing
participants to those determinations may hold different subjective
motives—e.g., the patent administrative body (promoting inventive
progress); the patentee (broadening the patent claims to exclude all
competition in the market); a competitor (invalidating a patent,
limiting the scope of the patent, and increasing ease of market entry
or competition); and the judiciary (resolving a question of law).
Those different subjective motives could result in inconsistent and,
therefore, unreliable determinations regarding a patent’s meaning,
scope, and validity—“thereby undermining the public notice
49

Id. at 978–79 (citations omitted).
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1116–17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
51
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
52
35 U.S.C. § 103.
53
Id. § 112(b).
54
Id.
55
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (internal quotations omitted); Innova/Pure Water,
Inc., 381 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted).
50
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function of patents” and inhibiting a meaningful exchange of ideas
or inventive progression.56
The risk of unreliable determinations in patent law is surely
reduced by construing the meaning of patent claims from the
perspective of a “hypothetical person skilled in the art to whom the
patent is addressed”57 because it eliminates at least some of the
influence that arises from participants’ subjective motives and
creates a consistent starting point to subsequently apply the
construed claims to determine patentability or invalidity. However,
participants’ subjective motives still influence a claim’s meaning,
causing unreliable determinations in patent law, through the
participants’ reliance on cherry-picked extrinsic evidence to support
a subjectively favorable construction of a claim—a concern that the
Federal Circuit has recognized in the claim construction process.58
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Claim construction is a necessary part of assessing patentability
of a patent application prior to issuance,59 as well as a requisite first
step in assessing liability in a patent infringement suit60—although,
the PTO does not typically treat claim construction as a separate and
distinct step from the patentability analysis, unlike in a patent
infringement suit. This Article limits the remaining discussion of
claim construction to its application in patent infringement suits.
The Claim Construction Standard
Claim construction is the process of determining the “ordinary
and customary meaning”61 that a patent claim “would have to a
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”62 This
“starting point is based on the well-settled understanding that
inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention
and that patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others
56

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (citation omitted).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
58
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
59
Id. at 1316 (citation omitted).
60
Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted).
61
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
62
Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116.
57
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of skill in the pertinent art.”63 Importantly, the relevant inventor
audience “is deemed to [have] read the claim term not only in the
context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”64
Thus, when construing the claims, the court begins its review with
the patent’s claims, specification,65 and prosecution history—i.e.,
the intrinsic evidence.66 While “the claim language is the most
important source . . . to consider in construing the claim terms,”67
the court does not “look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a
vacuum.”68 The intrinsic evidence as a whole “usually provides the
technological and temporal context to enable the court to ascertain
the meaning of the claim to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention.”69 The claims “define the invention to which the
patentee is entitled the right to exclude”70 and the specification, as
“a concordance for the claims,”71 is “the best source for discerning”
the meaning of a claim term within the “proper context.”72 In
addition, the prosecution history may enlighten the public (and
therefore the court) of differences in scope between the patentee’s
63

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
Id.
65
While the specification is statutorily defined to include the claims, courts
sometimes discuss claims as separate and distinct from the other components of
the specification. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly point out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”), with
Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 299, 313 (2016) (“Intrinsic
evidence consists of the patent claims, specification, and the patent’s prosecution
history.”) (citations omitted). Thus, for purposes of avoiding confusion with case
language, the term “specification” generally refers to the written description and
does not include the claims for the remainder of this Article.
66
Ross-Hime Designs, Inc., 126 Fed. Cl. at 313.
67
Bondyopadhyay v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 793, 801 (2017) (citation
omitted).
68
Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
69
V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citations omitted).
70
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
71
Id. at 1315 (citation omitted).
72
V-Formation, 401 F.3d at 1310 (citation omitted).
64
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claim term and the ordinary meaning of the claim term if the
patentee disclaimed a part of the ordinary meaning.73 “The
prosecution history is less useful in claim construction, however,
because it can itself be ambiguous as it represents ongoing
negotiations between the patent applicant and the PTO.”74 The court
may also look to extrinsic evidence for guidance so long as it is
“considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.”75 Extrinsic
evidence refers to “evidence outside of the patent record,” such as
dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, expert testimony, inventor
testimony, and prior art not considered in the prosecution history.76
Claim Construction Remains Exclusively with the Court
Claim construction constitutes the construction of a written
instrument and is therefore a question of law,77 necessarily requiring
the court to construe the asserted claims prior to the factfinder’s
liability assessment—the second step in determining infringement
or invalidity.78 While the construction of a patent claim is a
“question solely of law,” “subsidiary factfinding is sometimes
necessary” if the patent “uses ‘technical words or phrases not
commonly understood,’” “giv[ing] rise to a factual dispute.”79 “[I]n
that circumstance, the ‘determination of the matter of fact’” must
73

Comput. Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“Prosecution disclaimer protects the rights of competitors to rely on
representations made by the patentee during prosecution to guide their conduct.”).
74
Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 299, 313 (2016)
(citations omitted).
75
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. The standards surrounding the consideration for
extrinsic evidence are discussed separately. See infra Section III.C.
76
Advanced Aerospace Techs., Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 445, 458
(2015); Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1414
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
77
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“The patent is a fully integrated written instrument . . . . It follows, therefore,
from the general rule applicable to written instruments that a patent is uniquely
suited for having its meaning and scope determined entirely by a court as a matter
of law.”).
78
See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
79
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 319, 326 (2015)
(citations omitted).
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naturally “‘preced[e]’ the ‘function of construction’”80 because “a
factual finding may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal
question of the proper meaning of the term in the context of the
patent.”81 “[E]ven where the construction of a term of art has
‘evidentiary underpinnings,’” the entirety of the claim construction
determination remains “exclusively” with the court.82
Claim construction may raise reliability concerns where:
(i) “patent law is ‘a field where so much depends upon familiarity
with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained
in the general storehouse of knowledge and experience’”;83 (ii) “many
cases that give rise to litigation . . . require[ ] examination of terms
that have a particular meaning in a field of art”84; and (iii) “[a] judge
is not usually a person conversant in the particular technical art
involved and is not the hypothetical person skilled in the art to whom
a patent is addressed.”85 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly
recognized these inherent complexities that may arise in the claim
construction process due to the nature of patent law.86 The Court has
also recognized that patent claim construction is most analogous to
statutory interpretation, and consistent with that analogy, a patent
claim can “only [have] one correct interpretation . . . that applies to
all persons.”87 The Court subsequently concluded that a judge
“trained in the law” is still best positioned to “analyze the text of the
patent and its associated public record and apply the established
rules of construction, and in that way arrive at the true and consistent
scope of the patent owner’s rights to be given legal effect”88—
80

Id. at 326 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 333.
82
Id. at 321 (citation omitted).
83
Id. at 327 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 610 (1950)).
84
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
85
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
86
Id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
87
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 987 (noting that patent claim construction should
not be treated as a matter of fact, which “would at once deprive the inventor of
the opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his rights under
the patent[,] and in each case of infringement it would subject him to the danger
of false interpretation, from the consequences of which he could not escape”).
88
Id. at 979 (citations omitted).
81
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ensuring consistency with the “fundamental principle of American
law that ‘the construction of a written evidence [remains]
exclusively with[ ] the court.’”89 However, to construe the meaning
of words as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand those
words in the context of the patent—i.e., one who is familiar with the
technical art and the patent—a judge that often lacks familiarity in
the technical art must gain the necessary familiarity in order “‘to
place [them]self in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art’
reading the claims alongside the rest of the specification.”90 To gain
that familiarity, a judge may consult extrinsic evidence.91
Circumstances Surrounding a Court’s Consideration of
Extrinsic Evidence
The role of extrinsic sources in interpreting patent claims has
been a source of debate at the Federal Circuit.92 The Court has
consistently acknowledged that the technical complexities of patent
law necessitate discretion for the district court to consider extrinsic
evidence.93 The circumstances surrounding a court’s permissible
consideration of extrinsic evidence have not been consistently
stated. For example, in some cases, the Court has said it can only
look to extrinsic evidence if the claims are still ambiguous after
considering the intrinsic evidence.94 In other cases, the Court has
authorized the consideration of extrinsic evidence “if the court
deems it helpful” in its determination.95 Unfortunately, there is no
discussion regarding the synonymity of “ambiguous” and “helpful”
(the “synonymity question”), and the Court does not provide a clear
89

Id. at 978 (citations omitted).
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
91
See infra Section III.C (discussing the circumstances surrounding a court’s
consideration of extrinsic evidence).
92
See, e.g., Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337 (citations omitted); Tex. Digit. Sys.,
Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–04 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
93
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
94
See, e.g., Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 299, 313
(2016) (citation omitted).
95
See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
90
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reconciliation regarding the conditionality of the Court’s
consideration of extrinsic evidence (the “conditionality
requirement”).96 Naturally, the standard for using extrinsic evidence
represents an important consideration when analyzing whether a
new (to patent law) extrinsic source is applicable and useful. Thus,
this Article reviews the Federal Circuit’s approach to claim
construction and offers a clarifying opinion regarding when to
consider extrinsic evidence.97
1. The Federal Circuit’s Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence
Historically, the Federal Circuit has always considered the
intrinsic evidence when construing patent claims, but the emphasis
placed on the evidence was not always consistent. In Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,98 the Court placed “greater emphasis
[on] dictionary definitions of claim terms” and “assigned a less
prominent role to the specification and the prosecution history.”99
The Court saw dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises as
“objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information on
the established meanings that would have been attributed to the
terms of the claims by those of skill in the art.”100 The Court
consulted the intrinsic record after considering these extrinsic
sources, claiming a “presumption in favor of a dictionary
definition.”101
The Federal Circuit largely repudiated this line of cases in
Phillips v. AWH Corp., where the Court rejected the Texas Digital
methodology that permitted review of the intrinsic record “only after
a determination is made . . . as to the ordinary meaning or meanings
of the claim term in dispute” based on the extrinsic evidence.102 The
96

The “conditionality requirement” refers to the “only after,” “only when,”
“only if” kind of language incorporated into the rule for considering intrinsic or
extrinsic evidence.
97
It is this standard that the Authors apply to their assessment regarding the
availability and usefulness of corpus linguistics as an additional extrinsic source
in claim construction.
98
Tex. Digit. Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
99
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (discussing Tex. Digit. Sys., 308 F.3d at 1193).
100
Tex. Digit. Sys., 308 F.3d at 1202–03.
101
Id. at 1204.
102
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320.
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Phillips court cautioned against relying too heavily on extrinsic
sources that “focus[ ] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words
rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent,”103 thereby risking “change [to] the meaning of claims in
derogation of the ‘indisputable public records consisting of the
claims, the specification and the prosecution history’” and
“undermining the public notice function of patents.”104 In other
words, the Texas Digital methodology “entirely divorced [an
adopted dictionary definition] from the context of the written
description.”105 Without context, the court greatly risks construing
claims in a manner that is contrary to the claim construction
standard—i.e., using the PHOSITA as “an objective baseline”106—
and contrary to the patentability statute requiring enablement—i.e.,
describing the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art” to make or use the same.107
The Phillips court ultimately concluded that district courts maintain
the discretion to admit and use extrinsic evidence because “extrinsic
evidence may be useful,” but warned that they “should keep in mind
the flaws inherent in each type of evidence and assess that evidence
accordingly.”108 “Under this approach to claim construction,
evidence extrinsic to the patent is useful insofar as it ‘can shed useful
light on the relevant art—and thus better allow a court to place itself
in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art’ reading the claims
alongside the rest of the specification.”109
The Phillips court eliminated one split in the case law regarding
the consideration of extrinsic evidence: the option to review
extrinsic evidence first.110 Yet, the Court did not clearly repudiate
the inverse conditionality requirement, mandating intrinsic evidence
to be “ambiguous” prior to considering extrinsic evidence.111 The
103

Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
105
Id. at 1321.
106
Id. at 1313.
107
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
108
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
109
Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
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Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24.
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Id.
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Court also did not determine whether “ambiguous” can be
synonymous with terms like “helpful” or “useful”—all of which are
adjectives used in case descriptions of the standard for considering
extrinsic evidence.112 At a glance, this ambiguity is problematic and
may even offer some insight into some inconsistencies identified in
the evidentiary analysis for claim construction, as well as the
ultimate construction of claim terms. However, a review of the case
law demonstrates that the inconsistencies identified in these
standards are not contradictory and actually rely on the same
underlying principles, thereby offering clarity as to the correct
standard for considering extrinsic evidence during the claim
construction determination.
2. When Extrinsic Evidence May Be Considered
The conditionality requirement does not mean extrinsic
evidence can only be considered after a determination that the
intrinsic evidence is ambiguous. The Federal Circuit has previously
noted that its “strong cautionary statements on the proper use of
extrinsic evidence . . . might be misread by some members of the bar
as restricting a trial court’s ability to hear such evidence.”113 The
Court did clarify that, “[t]o the contrary, trial courts generally can
hear expert testimony for background and education on the
technology implicated by the presented claim construction
issues.”114 However, the Court somewhat muddles this clarification
by also stating that the district court can only “hear[ ] and rely[ ] on
expert testimony on an ultimate claim construction question in cases
in which the intrinsic evidence . . . does not answer the question.”115
The Court’s inconsistent clarification can be problematic because
the court must often rely on extrinsic evidence “for background and
education on the technology implicated by the presented claim
construction issues” in order to determine whether the claim terms
(after a review of the intrinsic evidence) are ambiguous from the
112
See, e.g., Ross-Hime Designs, Inc. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 299, 313
(2016); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319; Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337.
113
Key Pharms. v. Hercon Lab’ys Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(emphases in original).
114
Id.
115
Id.
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correct “objective baseline.”116 That is, the district court has the duty
to construe patent claims—which includes determining whether
there is ambiguity—as a judge would have understood the claims at
the time of the invention. Yet, a judge “is not the hypothetical person
skilled in the art to whom a patent is addressed.”117 In that situation,
it is highly likely that a review of the intrinsic evidence—without
reliance on extrinsic evidence providing the judge with the
necessary technical familiarity—will have an apparent ambiguity
because there is insufficient context to determine the meaning of the
claim, unless: i) “the specification . . . reveal[s] a special definition
. . . to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it
would otherwise possess”; or ii) the term has only one meaning
regardless of context.118 This is not to say that the specification does
not provide the necessary context to determine the term’s meaning,
nor to say that the intrinsic evidence is generally ambiguous,119 but
to say that a judge does not have sufficient context “to place itself in
the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art” to understand the
meaning of “the claims alongside the rest of the specification.”120
That is, again, because a judge “is not the hypothetical person skilled
in the art to whom a patent is addressed.”121 Thus, even selecting one
of two available meanings of a term based on a reading of the patent,
without reliance on at least some extrinsic evidence poses a risk, that
a judge will construe the term based on his subjective intuition of
the correct meaning when he is unfamiliar with or “not . . .
conversant in the particular technical art involved.”122 That risk is
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s endorsement to hear extrinsic
evidence “for background and education on the technology

116

Id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
118
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
119
Most likely, the intrinsic evidence is not ambiguous. And it should not be
ambiguous in light of Section 112’s definiteness and enablement requirements.
But that does not mean there are not apparent ambiguities since patents are written
for those having ordinary skill in the art, not judges.
120
Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
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Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
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implicated.”123 For these reasons, this Article argues that the Federal
Circuit’s somewhat muddled clarification was offering an implicit
distinction between “background and education on the technology
implicated” and “ultimate claim construction question” in its
application of the conditionality requirement.124 This Article
construes the conditionality requirement (and necessarily the
procedural consideration of extrinsic evidence) as follows:
1) The court may always consider extrinsic evidence that
“better allow[s] [the] court to place itself in the shoes of a
person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims
alongside the rest of the specification.”125 Informed by the
extrinsic evidence necessary to place itself in the shoes of
the PHOSITA, the court reviews the intrinsic evidence to
determine the ordinary meaning of the claims from his
PHOSITA perspective.
2) If a term is still ambiguous after review of the intrinsic
evidence (informed by the extrinsic evidence necessary to
make this consideration from the correct PHOSITA
perspective), then the court may consider additional extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity and reach the “ultimate
claim construction question.”126
This Article argues this construction is consistent with the
Federal Circuit’s standard and simply offers some clarification.
Ultimately, “[w]hat is disapproved of is an attempt to use extrinsic
evidence to arrive at a claim construction that is clearly at odds with
the claim construction mandated by . . . the written record of the
patent.”127 The claim construction mandated by the written record of
the patent must always be from the perspective of the PHOSITA that
is presumed to have read the patent. Thus, the perspective of the
PHOSITA must inform the judge’s reading of the patent. The judge
must be sufficiently familiar with the “background and education on

123

Key Pharms. v. Hercon Lab’ys. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id.
125
Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337 (citation omitted).
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Key Pharms., 161 F.3d at 716.
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Id. (citations omitted).
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the technology implicated”128 in order to acquire the perspective of
the PHOSITA, often relying on extrinsic evidence, and that step
must naturally precede the judge’s reading of the patent. Extrinsic
evidence can accordingly be considered prior to an ambiguity
determination on the intrinsic evidence.
This Article’s construction of the conditionality requirement
also resolves the synonymity question because the “ambiguity”
language must be understood in context of the rules to consider
extrinsic evidence. Reviewed in context, the Federal Circuit
implicitly refers to two separate ambiguities that arise based on the
two-step process for considering extrinsic evidence (now clarified
in this Article’s construction of the conditionality requirement):
i) the ambiguity that arises because a judge is unfamiliar with and
“not . . . conversant in the particular technical art involved”;129 and
ii) the ambiguity that cannot be resolved from the PHOSITA’s
reading of the patent.130 The first ambiguity is resolved by the court’s
review and reliance upon the evidence necessary to “better allow
[the] court to place itself in the shoes . . . of ordinary skill in the
art.”131 Here, the first ambiguity is called an “apparent ambiguity.”
An apparent ambiguity refers to a “text [or claim term] [that] at first
blush appears susceptible to more than one interpretation,” but
actually “has only one correct linguistic meaning, though that
correct meaning may be difficult to discern.”132 “[S]uch ambiguities
can be resolved if we have the right contextual evidence
available . . . .”133 Under this understanding of the first (apparent)
ambiguity, the construction of the conditionality requirement
permits the court to consider the “contextual evidence”134 that “better
allow[s] [the] court to place itself in the shoes of a person of ordinary
skill in the art [to whom the patent is addressed]”135—which is the
128
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
130
Key Pharms., 161 F.3d at 716.
131
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual, 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation
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same permitted consideration the court has applied when using the
“useful” language136 and substantially similar to the “helpful”
language the court has also implemented, therefore permitting the
synonymity of these terms.137
This understanding and approach find further support in the
Federal Circuit’s discussion of ambiguity in Markman v. Westview
Instruments.138 In this case, the Court noted that “ideally there should
be no ‘ambiguity’ in claim language to one of ordinary skill in the
art that would require resort to evidence outside the specification
and prosecution history.”139 The Court’s discussion is because “the
patent’s claims [should be] sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO”
to issue a patent, and, therefore, “there should exist no factual
ambiguity when those claims are later construed by a court of law
in an infringement action.”140 The Court noted that extrinsic
evidence may still be necessary, however, “this evidence is not for
the purpose of clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology. It is not
ambiguity in the document that creates the need for extrinsic
evidence but rather unfamiliarity of the court with the terminology
of the art to which the patent is addressed.”141 In other words, the
extrinsic evidence is needed to provide the right contextual evidence
to clarify an apparent ambiguity—i.e., the correct interpretation of a
term in the context of one familiar with “terminology of the art to
which the patent is addressed.”142
The second ambiguity does not impact the compatibility of the
construction of the conditionality requirement and the Federal
Circuit’s potentially inconsistent iterations of the standard for
considering extrinsic evidence.143 However, there is brief discussion
of this ambiguity as it is ultimately relevant to this Article’s proposal
136

See id. (citation omitted).
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (recognizing
a court’s discretion to consider extrinsic evidence that “help[s] educate the court
regarding the field of invention and [that] help[s] the court determine what a
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to incorporate corpus linguistic tools into the available extrinsic
sources to consider in claim construction. The second ambiguity is
most likely resolved by the court’s review and reliance upon the
extrinsic evidence that would have been available to and considered
by the PHOSITA, if the PHOSITA’s reading of the intrinsic
evidence resulted in more than one interpretation of a claim term.144
Thus, the second ambiguity may also be an apparent ambiguity that
simply requires the court to consider those sources that would have
been available to the PHOSITA that would provide the contextual
extrinsic evidence necessary to resolve a term’s ambiguity.145 Yet,
the second ambiguity may not necessarily be resolved with “the
right contextual evidence available . . . .”146 Should such a
circumstance occur, then the claim’s ambiguity would not enable a
PHOSITA to make or use the invention and would, therefore, result
in the invalidation of the claim.147
In sum, the court may consider extrinsic evidence on two
occasions. First, the court may review and rely on any contextual
evidence that will better allow the court to place itself in the shoes
of the PHOSITA that is presumed to have read the patent. Second,
the court may consider additional extrinsic evidence that would have
been available to the PHOSITA only if the court’s reading of the
patent and prosecution history from the PHOSITA’s perspective
results in more than one interpretation of a claim term.
Evidentiary Shortcomings of Existing Extrinsic Sources
Despite the important role extrinsic evidence plays in ensuring a
consistent application of the claim construction standard—i.e.,
ensuring that judges have the contextual evidence necessary to
determine the ordinary meaning of a claim term in the context of a
patent as a PHOSITA would read that patent—the existing extrinsic
sources offer minimal, if any, guidance to the credibility and
reliability of the sources considered. These sources are viewed “in
general as less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in
144
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determining how to read claim terms . . . .”148 This perception is
because: i) “extrinsic evidence by definition is not part of the patent
and does not have the specification’s virtue of being created at the
time of patent prosecution for the purpose of explaining the patent’s
scope and meaning”; ii) “extrinsic publications may not be written
by or for [the] skilled artisans and therefore may not reflect the
understanding of a skilled artisan in the field of the patent”;
iii) “expert reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and
for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not
present in intrinsic evidence”; iv) “there is a virtually unbounded
universe of potential extrinsic evidence of some marginal relevance
that could be brought to bear on any claim construction question”
and “each party will naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic
evidence most favorable to its cause, leaving the court with the
considerable task of filtering the useful extrinsic evidence from the
fluff”; and v) “undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk
that it will be used to change the meaning of claim terms in
derogation of the [intrinsic record], thereby undermining the public
notice function of patents.”149
The Federal Circuit has cautioned courts to “keep in mind the
flaws inherent in each type of evidence and assess the evidence
accordingly” when using extrinsic evidence to assess the ordinary
meaning of claim terms.150 The Court’s concerns are valid when
considering the existing extrinsic sources relied upon in claim
construction proceedings. However, the flaws recognized by the
Court were premised not on the conceptual value of extrinsic
evidence as a whole, but on the particular risks of relying on
extrinsic sources that lack objective indicators of meaning when
construing claim terms within the context of the patent. In other
words, the existing extrinsic sources risk separating the meaning of
words from the context of the patent because these sources “focus[ ]
the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words.”151 Moreover, where
existing extrinsic sources provide two (or more) interpretations of
the same claim term, the court risks construing the claims based on
148
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“human linguistic intuition alone,” despite lacking the “linguistic
intuition” of the PHOSITA—which may still result in unreliable
construction—let alone having any certain methodology to
objectively determine the linguistic meaning of the PHOSITA. That
human linguistic intuition, even in a non-technical field, is often
unreliable.152 However, in patent law, where a judge does not
typically represent the hypothetical person’s ordinary skill in the
technical field, the reliability problem is exacerbated because judges
must often choose between cherry-picked extrinsic evidence that is
not representative of the technical field as a whole, and must make
credibility determinations regarding that evidence.153
This Article briefly reviews the risks of unreliable claim
construction resulting from the flaws inherent in the existing
extrinsic sources. These sources can be divided into two categories:
1) publicly available written resources that offer “linguistically
permissible” meanings of words in the abstract; and 2) subjective
testimony that does not reliably represent the PHOSITA’s
understanding of claim terms.154
1. Dictionaries, Encyclopedias, and Treatises
“[W]hile dictionaries are a good starting point, when faced with
dueling plausible meanings, dictionaries cannot solve the dilemma
of ambiguity because they only tell whether ‘a particular meaning is
linguistically permissible,’ not whether it is ordinary.”155 This
concern was recognized in Phillips v. AWH Corp.156 In that case, the
Court explained that “[d]ictionaries, by their nature, provide an
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Cf. Lee & Phillips, supra note 15, at 289 (“So our intuitions are likely to be
affected by our biases ‘about what the constitutional language “ought to mean.”’
‘The influence of these beliefs on [judicial] intuitions may not be fully
transparent;’ in other words [judges] may have strong beliefs about what the
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own biases and preconceptions.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
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Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
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Phillips et al., supra note 8, at 23. See Markman v. Westview Instruments,
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expansive array of definitions.”157 Thus, “[a] claim should not rise
or fall based upon the preferences of a particular dictionary editor,
or the court’s independent decision, uninformed by the
specification, to rely on one dictionary rather than another.”158 In
other words, dictionary definitions offer an “expansive array” of
permissible meanings in the abstract and subsequently leave a
judge—not skilled in the art—to rely on his intuition to determine
which meaning represents the “ordinary meaning” as one of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood a term in the context
of a patent.159 There is a risk of “transforming the meaning of the
claim term to the [PHOSITA] into the meaning of the term in the
abstract, out of its particular context, which is the specification”
when a court relies “on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic
evidence.”160 It is agreed that ensuring the term’s meaning within the
context of the patent is a priority.161 “Context matters, and
dictionaries . . . do not capture context and phrasal meanings.”162
Moreover, the contextual evidence necessary to ensure a reliable
interpretation of a term’s ordinary meaning is not limited to the
patent.163 It also requires the court to consider the term’s meaning in
the contextual perspective—or objective baseline—of the
PHOSITA.164 For these reasons, a dictionary alone rarely provides
the contextual evidence necessary for the court to determine the
linguistic meaning of the claim terms.165 Substantially similar
reasonings likewise apply to encyclopedias and treatises because
these extrinsic sources do not identify the ordinary meaning from
the PHOSITA’s perspective, but instead offer the permissible
linguistic meanings of terms.166
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2. Inventor and Expert Testimony
Inventor and expert testimony are often not reliable when
determining the ordinary meaning of claim terms.167 Concerning
inventor testimony, it may be influenced by motives to construe
claims as broadly as possible to incorporate the accused infringing
products.168 The bias inherently incorporated into an inventor’s
testimony substantially overrides any credibility that may be
attributed to their understanding of the claim terms.169 More
importantly, the inventor does not often represent an objective
starting point for determining how the PHOSITA would understand
the claim terms, which is in part due to its subjective motives, but
also due to the misconception that that patentee’s understanding of
the terms has any relevance.170 The court has expressly discounted
the subjective views of the patentee and the PTO.171 Thus, inventor
testimony is often unreliable without the addition of other extrinsic
evidence that may offer credibility to such testimony.172
Expert testimony is often more constructive because experts are
skilled in the art and do not possess the same incentives as do
inventors, but experts are hired by parties to advance the interests of
that party.173 While experts might appear more objective, that is not
always the case. Moreover, even the most objective expert, who
seeks to create a reputation for unbiased testimony, is merely one
person. His or her expert testimony reveals one PHOSITA’s opinion
regarding the meaning of a term, and thus only one person’s
intuition regarding the proper construction.174
167
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985–86 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (citations omitted).
168
See SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
169
Id. at 1195 (citation omitted).
170
Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–
19 (citations omitted).
171
Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–
19 (citations omitted).
172
See Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1318–19 (citations omitted).
173
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citations omitted).
174
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19.
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The Need for Linguistic Tools in Claim Construction
“[T]he best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as
understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”175 This
means that the court must first become sufficiently familiar with the
technical field to place itself into the shoes of one of skill in the art
at the time of the invention.176 Then, the court must determine the
meaning of claim terms as they are used in context, beginning with
the specification, and subsequently considering the relevant
extrinsic evidence that would have been available to the PHOSITA
if additional contextual evidence is necessary.177 To do so reliably,
the court must assess the dependability of the extrinsic evidence
considered—i.e., the court must emphasize the objectivity and
context of all extrinsic sources considered when determining the
ordinary meaning of claim terms.178 However, as discussed above,
the existing extrinsic sources often lack the objectivity and context
necessary to ensure the reliability of extrinsic evidence considered
when construing patent claims.179 For this reason, there is a need for
additional linguistic tools in claim construction to aid courts in
objectively choosing contextual evidence that will enlighten the
court as to the meaning of claim terms as understood by the
PHOSITA to whom the patent is addressed.180 This Article proposes
the use of corpus linguistics to guide the court to a more reliable
construction of the claim terms as one of ordinary skill in the art
would have understood those terms in the context of the patent.181

175

Moba, 325 F.3d at 1315 (citations omitted).
See id.
177
See id.
178
See id.
179
See id.
180
See id.
181
See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B (providing more details about why available
corpus linguistic tools are useful and reliable in a claim construction
determination).
176
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IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS
A. What Is Corpus Linguistics?
Corpus linguistics, at base, is a tool to analyze language usage.182
This tool is an empirical approach to “the study of language
(linguistics) through systematic analysis of data derived from large
databases of naturally occurring language (corpora, the plural of
corpus, a body of language).”183 Unlike qualitative methods of
determining word meaning, such as consulting dictionaries and
analyzing isolated print examples of words or phrases, corpus
linguistics is a quantitative linguistic methodology.184 The data
contained in a linguistic corpus allows “legal interpreters to look for
meaning in the surrounding linguistic context of an utterance” in a
systematic manner and “to gain meaningful and quantifiable insight
about the range of possible uses of a word and the frequency of its
different senses.”185 In other words, corpus linguistics’ research
methodology facilitates the study of language function and use
through the analysis of large quantities of language.186 The words
contained in corpora occur naturally, meaning that they were
produced in everyday speech or writings.187 Some corpora contain
millions or even billions of words written in newspapers, magazines,
trade or academic journals, and fiction books.188 Other corpora are
more targeted, as discussed below, containing only those texts that
exhibit the same characteristics as the language being studied (i.e.,
technical or scientific texts for interpretation of technical terms).
182

See Lee & Phillips, supra note 15, at 289.
See id.
184
Corpus linguistics is quantitative in nature in the sense that linguists use the
methodology to analyze a large quantity of data through a randomized sample of
a particular word or phrase. However, much of the corpus linguistics data must be
analyzed in a non-statistical manner somewhat paralleling qualitative research
methods.
185
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 832 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
186
DOUGLAS BIBER, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 159
(Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2009).
187
See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 795.
188
Lee & Phillips, supra note 15, at 290; CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
ENGLISH, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/BA5U-2GJR].
183
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1. Corpora
Generalized corpora are typically large corpora that are collected
in an attempt to represent a “broad (often national) speech
community.”189 Examples include American English, British
English, and newspaper writing on the internet.190 These corpora
tend to collect massive amounts of texts in popular registers of their
domain (e.g., academic publications, newspaper articles, popular
fiction, etc.) and are useful for examinations targeted at answering
broad research questions.191 These corpora should be examined
closely to determine if the included texts truly represent the target
population. While these corpora are impressively large Corpus of
Contemporary American English (“COCA”) is now over one billion
words in size, they do not accurately represent every language
domain.192 To clarify, though COCA could be useful in attempting
to understand the general use of a term, it would not be the best
corpus to determine how American slang is used in California.
Specialized corpora are corpora designed to answer specific
research questions and represent specialized populations (e.g.,
Founding Era English, abstracts written in English by native
Chinese speakers, aeronautical engineering texts, etc.).193 This type
of corpora, in contrast to generalized corpora, would be best to
determine how American slang is used in California. In specialized
corpora, it is likely to find texts that are more specific than those
contained in a generalized corpus (e.g., tweets sent by Donald
Trump since 2015). Specialized corpora are typically created on a
case-by-case basis and are not as openly available as generalized
corpora tend to be.194 Contrary to popular belief, specialized corpora
189

Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 830.
Id. at 830–31.
191
See id. at 828–29.
192
See Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1915, 1956 (2010) (explaining that sample texts “must contain speech and
text from the linguistic community which [they] purport[ ] to represent”).
193
See RANDI REPPEN, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS
32 (Anne O’Keeffe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2012).
194
JESSE EGBERT, TOVE LARSSON, & DOUGLAS BIBER, DOING LINGUISTICS
WITH A CORPUS: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EVERYDAY USER
172 (Susan Hunston ed., 2020).
190
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are usually the most appropriate choice for answering research
questions in corpus linguistics. They are not, however, as readily
available or as user friendly as generalized corpora,195 and thus are
often overlooked.
2. Corpus Linguistic Tools
Corpus linguistic tools process data from a corpus that can be
used to: (i) “measure the statistical frequency of words and word
senses in a given speech community and over a given time period”;
(ii) “show collocation, ‘which is the tendency of words to be biased
in the way they co-occur’”; and (iii) demonstrate “concordance . . .
which allows [ ] users to review a particular word or phrase in
hundreds of contexts, all on the same page of running text.”196
There are many corpus linguistic tools, but for these purposes,
the explanation is restricted to the few that will be pertinent to the
examination. First, a corpus search for a particular word or phrase
returns a random sample, avoiding the Federal Circuit’s criticism of
many extrinsic sources in that parties cannot “choose the pieces of
extrinsic evidence most favorable to its cause, leaving the court with
the considerable task of filtering the useful extrinsic evidence from
the fluff.”197 Second, words in the corpus are tagged for grammatical
content, which allows the user to search for (or compare) examples
of, for instance, patent terms used in different grammatical senses.198
Third, a corpus search allows a party to see each individual result in
the context of its original sentence.199 Depending on the user
interface, a corpus will allow the user to view the 150 or more words
surrounding the target words to assist in accurately determining the
term’s usage.200 Fourth, corpora include tools to search for
collocates.201 Collocates are words most typically used in
conjunction with the target term.202 This tool is especially beneficial
because the collocation shows “the tendency of words to be biased
195

Id.
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 831–32.
197
Phillips v. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 831–32.
201
Id.
202
Id.
196
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in the way they co-occur,” thus, assisting in finding associations
between words.203 A collocation list “is therefore ‘something of a
short-cut to the information that could be obtained from
concordance lines,’ and may be used to confirm the data already
extracted from the corpus.”204
When constructing a specialized corpus, which will likely be
necessary for many patent cases, other tools are available. These
include part-of-speech (“POS”) taggers, concordancers, and web
scrapers.205
For parties hoping to construct their own corpus, for litigation or
otherwise, the party may use a web scraper to begin.206 A web
scraper is a computer program that allows for automatic collection
of texts from websites (e.g., automatic collection of patents from
Google Patents).207 Parties may also use AntConc, a particularly
useful concordance program that allows a user to input their own
corpus files to examine concordance lines, frequency data,
collocations, and keywords.208 This program uses concordancers,
which are useful as they allow the user to examine the word of
interest in all of the contexts in which it naturally occurs without
having to manually identify the relevant locations.209 Lastly, a party
would use POS taggers, like the Biber Tagger, to automatically tag,
in a constructed corpus, the part of speech (i.e., noun, verb,
adjective) of a word as well as other grammatical information (i.e.,
compliment clause, action verb, etc.).210 Thus, POS taggers make it
203

Id.
Id.
205
Laurence Anthony, A Critical Look at Software Tools in Corpus Linguistics,
30 LINGUSTIC RSCH. 144, 147, 152 (2013).
206
See Wolfram Bartussek, Building Concise Text Corpora from Web
Contents, RESEARCHGATE 2 (2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32450
8522_Building_Concise_Text_Corpora_from_Web_Contents [https://perma.cc/22ESWNUV].
207
Id.
208
See Concordancing with AntConc: An introduction to tools and techniques
in corpus linguistics, JACET NEWSLETTER ISSUE 55, at 2085 (2006).
209
Id.
210
Bethany Gray, Tagging and Counting Linguistic Features for MultiDimensional Analysis, in MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS: RESEARCH METHODS
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possible to grammatically analyze large bodies of texts and
understand the behaviors of individual words.211 All of these tools
are imperative to creating and analyzing a corpus, as they make it
possible to examine features of interest (here, meanings of a word)
in relatively short amounts of time.212
B. The Theoretical Case for Using Corpus Linguistics in Claim
Construction
The claim construction standard aims to interpret claims as
would a person having “ordinary skill in the art.”213 Granted, patents
disclose an invention to the public, but a patent’s principal purpose
is to give notice to potential competitors (and other inventors) of the
exact scope of the patentee’s monopoly.214 For this reason, courts
endeavor to interpret patent claims in a manner consistent with how
a potential competitor or inventor, skilled in the same field of
inquiry, would interpret the scope of the patent’s claims.215
Judges, who are tasked with interpreting patent claims as if they
were a PHOSITA, can rarely rely on personal knowledge regarding
the inventive field, and it would be nearly impossible for a judge to
gain sufficient familiarity with the subject matter to obtain
PHOSITA perspective during the pendency of a case. It is therefore
imperative that courts employ objective tools for discovering
meaning so as not to give a patent broader or narrower scope than
those in the industry would ascribe to the invention.
Corpus linguistics could fill the void. Corpus linguistics has
many characteristics that allow it to be an objective tool on which
courts can rely in construing claims, the scope of which could
impact an entire industry. Granted, corpus linguistics will not be
dispositive in every (or even any) case, but the advantages of using
corpus linguistics over other forms of extrinsic evidence are too
numerous to ignore.
AND CURRENT ISSUES 43, 44–45

(Tony Berber Sardinha & Marcia Veirano Pinto
eds., 2019).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
35 U.S.C. § 103.
214
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
215
Id.

APR 2021]

Corpus Linguistics

369

Using corpora, for instance, is transparent. Corpus linguistics
analysis is not done in a black box, and parties’ counsel and experts
have complete access to the results of any corpus analysis. The
results and methodology would be subject to critique and
cross-examination in a way not possible with using dictionaries and
other extrinsic evidence. When parties construct their own
specialized corpus, the chosen methodology—how two parties
chose the sources, the representativeness of these sources, the size
of the corpus, and all other aspects—would also be subject to
cross-examination and potentially expert testimony.
Beyond the advantages of using a specialized corpus with
representative samples of texts written by and for skilled artisans,
corpus analyses in the patent context bring the benefits present in all
corpus searches, such as:
 Results are randomized, so the court can more confidently
conclude that each party has not proffered cherry-picked
“extrinsic evidence most favorable to its cause.”216
 Courts are not required to determine the meaning of patent
claims, relying solely on “human linguistic intuition
alone,”217 weighing the credibility of existing extrinsic
sources that only define claim terms in the abstract. Courts
can avoid “the considerable task of filtering the useful
extrinsic evidence from the fluff” with only its subjective
intuition about the usage and meaning of a term.218
 Corpus results return many examples, so courts can be more
confident that isolated examples are not ideocratic usages of
a term.
 Corpus analyses can search for complete phrases.
 Examples of usage in corpora are real life examples in
context.
In sum, corpus linguistics offers courts the ability to consider
qualitatively how the majority of those in the inventive field use a
particular term. Further, corpus linguistics allows courts to gain
216

Id. at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 16, at 831.
218
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (citations omitted).
217
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insight into how a PHOSITA would view the patent monopoly,
which assists the court in applying the standard to interpret patent
terms “as understood by one of skill in the art.”219
As corpus linguists have shown, the intuition when it comes to
language use is surprisingly inaccurate and unreliable.220 Thus,
methods such as corpus linguistics and tools such as corpora are
extremely valuable in any field interested in the nature of authentic
language use. Particularly, in law, corpus linguistics can be
instrumental, as many cases hinge on determining the meaning of a
word.221 While dictionaries have been used to determine meaning in
legal cases historically,222 dictionaries have two major flaws: they
cannot consider the use of a word in different contexts, and they
cannot reliably provide the most common use of a word. Corpora,
on the other hand, can be used to determine both how a word is used
and how frequently a word is used in a specific manner. With
corpora, one can obtain frequency counts of a word, determine how
and how often a word is used across registers, examine a word in the
natural contexts it occurred in, and obtain collocates, or words that
frequently co-occur with the word of interest. Thus, with corpora,
one can reliably determine not only the meaning of a word, but also
the most common meaning.
219

Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted).
220
Douglas Biber et al., Corpus-based Approaches to Issues in Applied
Linguistics, 15 APPLIED LINGUISTICS, June 1, 1984, at 169, 169–189.
221
See, e.g., Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Cf. Chiang & Solum, supra note 2, at 530 (“Linguistic ambiguity is
believed to cause tremendous uncertainty about patent rights. Scholars and judges
have accordingly devoted enormous attention to developing better linguistic tools
to help courts understand patent claims.”). Chiang and Solum contend, however,
that lexical ambiguity does not play much of a role in patent claim construction;
rather, judges construe terms to align with policy goals, “constructing” rather than
“interpreting” patent claims. While Chiang and Solum provide some interesting
insights into a court’s process of interpreting (or, rather, constructing) patent
terms, we are not persuaded that genuine issues of lexical ambiguity do not arise
in patent law. Moreover, tools such as corpus linguistics may better assist courts
to resolve lexical ambiguities so that courts need not resort to policy
considerations.
222
See, e.g., Intex Recreation Corp. v. Metalast, S.A. Sociedad Unipersonal,
245 F. Supp. 2d 65, 65 (D.D.C. 2003).
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C. General Corpus: Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks
Courts are often tasked with determining the meaning of
lexically ambiguous terms during patent claim construction. In
many cases, the terms the court must construe are ordinary terms,
terms not containing a technical or scientific meaning known only
to those skilled in the art of the invention. One such case is Eon
Corporation IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks.223 In that case,
Eon alleged that Silver Spring infringed three of Eon’s patents
related to “networks for two-way interactive communications.”224
These networks included local receivers that could be placed in
locations where signals would be difficult to reach, including
basements.
Eon’s patent claims required that these local receivers, or
“subscriber units,” be “portable” or “mobile.”225 The two sides
offered competing interpretations of these two words.226 Since
Silver Spring used small subscriber units in the manner specified by
Eon’s patent claims but attached these units to the side of buildings,
it advanced a definition of portable and mobile that excluded Silver
Spring’s use.227 It argued that the units must be “capable of being
easily and conveniently moved from one location where the
subscriber unit is operable to a second location where the subscriber
unit is operable, and designed to operate without a fixed location.”228
Eon, unsurprisingly, held a broader view of its patent rights, arguing
that the units merely needed to be “capable of being easily
moved . . . but not that it actually has to move.”229 The one thing the
parties agreed on was that “the terms ‘portable’ and ‘mobile’ carry
the same meaning and can be construed the same.”230
The district court declined to resolve the ambiguity, concluding
solely that the terms “do not require construction because their
223

Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
224
Id.
225
Id. at 1317.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. (alteration in original).
230
Id. at 1317 n.1.
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meanings are clear in the context of the claims and will be readily
understandable to the jury.”231 The jury returned a verdict against
Silver Spring, necessarily concluding that Silver Spring had
infringed Eon’s patents because the subscriber units Silver Spring
utilized, which were small but attached to buildings, were portable
or mobile.232
The Federal Circuit reversed.233 The majority of the court found
“that no reasonable jury could have found that Silver Spring’s utility
meters infringe the two remaining patents.”234 The majority
construed the patent’s terms to require a subscriber unit to be easily
moved. The Court conceded that “[a]lthough the terms ‘portable’
and ‘mobile’ might theoretically, in the abstract, be given [a
broader] meaning, they cannot be construed that way in the context”
of the patents at issue.235
This Article sets out to test this conclusion empirically. First, it
must be determined whether the parties (and the court) were correct
in concluding that the terms “carry the same meaning and can be
construed the same.”236 Second, it must be uncovered whether the
terms could only “theoretically” be construed to reference any
object capable of moving or whether such a usage was common or
even the majority usage. For these purposes, the terms mobile and
portable were examined, which are defined by dictionaries in the
following way:
Mobile (adj.): (1) able to move or be moved freely or easily
(Google Dictionary)237; (2) capable of moving or being moved
: MOVABLE // a mobile missile launcher // a mobile laboratory238
Portable (adj.): (1) able to be easily carried or moved,
especially because being of a lighter and smaller version than
231

Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 1316.
235
Id. at 1321.
236
Id. at 1317 n.1.
237
Mobile, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/FC6K-M58C]
(search for “mobile”) (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
238
Mobile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
mobile [https://perma.cc/Q44W-W6ZU] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
232
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usual239; (2) capable of being carried or moved about // a
portable TV240
As shown by these definitions, the terms appear to share very
similar meanings. Solely relying on these definitions, one could
argue that the definitions are essentially the same, or that the
definitions are subtly different. However, this Article hypothesizes
that corpora may have shown that these two terms, though closely
related in meaning, are in fact not synonymous. To test this
hypothesis, the two terms must be searched in a general corpus of
American English, COCA, to determine whether these terms
demonstrate similar usage patterns.
1. Methods
a. The Corpus
The COCA was used to conduct this examination. COCA was
selected as it is the only large, genre-balanced corpus of American
English readily available.241 While there are no claims that it is
perfectly representative of American English, COCA is likely the
most comprehensive and most commonly used corpora of American
English.242 COCA contains over one billion words divided equally
among several genres, including “spoken, fiction, popular
magazines, newspapers, [and] academic texts.”243 Additionally, the
corpus is divided evenly over the years of 1990-2019.244 These
divisions are unimportant for our purposes, as this Article examines
the above terms, mobile and portable, equally and fairly across the
entire corpus. However, these divisions could be important to other
inquiries, as they offer further explanations as to why a word is used
in a specific manner.

239

Portable, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/KYG43GNM] (search for “portable”) (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
240
Portable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/portable [https://perma.cc/GZ4L-VJJP] (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
241
CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, supra note 188.
242
Id.
243
Id.
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Id.
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b. The Searches
In this search, and all searches thereafter, mobile and portable
will be tagged as adjectives, so results will be restricted to only
generate how the terms are used in their adjectival forms. This
restriction will avoid convolution with the usage of terms such as
Mobile, Alabama, or a child’s mobile. The initial step in
determining whether mobile and portable are synonymous terms
will be a general search of the two terms for the overall frequency
and 100 randomly-generated concordance lines (the word in its
authentic context). This information will be instrumental in the
determination of how each term is used, as well as the commonality
of the terms.
Next, the most common collocates of each term will be
examined to help determine whether the terms contain nuanced
differences in meaning. This examination will utilize the
“collocates” tab on the COCA interface, which allows the user to
examine the most common collocates individually as well as the
frequency data for how commonly the collocates occur with the
word of interest. In addition, the user can examine the word in
context with the collocate for further understanding of how the word
is used.
The last part of the examination will be a direct comparison
between the collocates of the two terms. Using the “compare” tab
on the COCA interface, this comparison will directly reveal the
differences or similarities in the meaning and usage of the two terms.
This feature will directly highlight the difference in collocations for
the terms in a side-by-side chart comparison by determining the ratio
of word one (in this case mobile) to word two (in this case portable).
If the words are indeed synonymous, some overlap in collocations
would be expected.
2. Results
a. The General Search
The initial search revealed that the adjectival form of mobile
occurs much more frequently in the corpus than the adjectival form
of portable, with overall frequency counts of 10,245 and 5,747
respectively. While this search provides no conclusive results, the
search does suggest that mobile may have a more versatile use than
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portable. Next, 100 “randomly sample[d] concordance lines” of
each term were collected. See Tables 1 and 2 below.
Table 1. Randomly sampled concordance lines: Mobile
Year and Register

Concordance Line (word in context)

1

2015 ACAD

horizon included social networking, while the second
horizon included mobile phones. 2008: The first horizon
included collaboration webs. 2009: The first

2

2005 MAG

3

1999 MAG

4

2013 MAG

5

1998 MAG

grandfather dug many years ago. We started with
a mobile home, but then several years later replaced it with
a modular home of the wide western Pacific Ocean, engaging in
widespread mobile combat. This truly would be the
wondrous effect of the " central location
mean you are protected. # Whenever you are
using mobile devices at public hotspots, it is safe to assume
you are not alone
out questions and debate them: Can one be a Christian and
be an upwardly mobile capitalist?

6

1993 MAG

's a need -- a twenty-four/seven operation. We're mobile;
we'll come to you.' It's a serious -- sometimes

7

2003 SPOK

inspectors cannot discount the possibility that Iraq has
developed mobile production facilities, or that it has
production equipment at other hidden sites.

8

2013 NEWS

9

2002 NEWS

10

2002 NEWS

jumping on board to help companies implement and enforce
new mobile device usage policies. Sales of MDM systems
rose to $790 million in 2012
Levi donated several thousand dollars toward the county's
first mobile defibrillator. Not two months later, Payne said,
it saved a man
US to dovetail with the existing FAA system.
New mobile radar units are filling blind spots. Technology
is being installed that can "
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Table 2. Randomly sampled concordance lines: Portable
Year & Register

Concordance line (word in context)

1

2009 MAG

14,000 photos. Luckily, Lenovo makes a fast
320GB portable hard drive ($219; lenovo.com) with an
attached USB cable and an

2

1991 SPOK

3

2011 MAG

4

1993 SPOK

5

2006 NEWS

6

1993 MAG

a commercial jet, they'd have an electronically
secure portable phone and that purpose was fulfilled.
What's happening, Pat, is
months of battlefield setbacks. The upgraded explosives
are more portable than the old stuff and easier to
conceal. " They're keeping the
What we're talking about is something that is
completely portable, something that you could read in
bed, read at a coffee shop
to the Dish Network satellite service can buy a
PocketDISH portable recorder
($200-$500)
and
transfer shows from their satellite set-top box. Many
, if they sell any at all. (Many portable PCs still use 386
chips, however.) And new 286 systems are

7

2004 SPOK

these bottled waters. However, tap water's not portable.
So, if you need to drink the six to eight glasses that we

8

2008 MAG

9

2003 MAG

10

2013 ACAD

and
the
sound
effects
were
tinny,
but
Nintendo's portable console offered gaming on the go.
21 Polyphonic Ringtones 1998 Whether your taste
previous personal computers. 1985-89: Portable PCs
finally become portable, with lightweight, notebookstyle laptops, including models by Radio Shack,
Compaq
Heights, IL). Height was measured using
a portable child-adult measuring stadiometer board
with inch-foot measuring tape and auto head lock
(ShorrBoard

The concordance lines reveal two interesting characteristics of
the terms. First, mobile appears most commonly before the noun it
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is modifying, while portable appears evenly as a pre- and
post-modifier of its respective noun. Additionally, mobile modifies
both animate (e.g., we and capitalist) and inanimate objects (e.g.,
home, device, etc.), while portable modifies only inanimate objects
(e.g., explosives, hard-drives, PCs, etc.). These modifications
suggest that in authentic language use, there is a difference in
preference that renders the definitions of the terms as slightly
different. Moreover, it demonstrates that there are times when the
terms are interchangeable (e.g., with the use of phone), and times
when the terms are not (e.g., saying “we’re portable” would be
awkward but “we’re mobile” is acceptable).
b. Collocations
To get a further sense of the two terms, the terms’ most frequent
collocates were next examined. For purposes of space, this Article
only reports the five most frequent collocates before and after each
term. Collocates before both terms consist of “a,” “the,” “and,” “of,”
and a comma, in similar orders. This examination merely suggests
that each term appears in a similar context, which is expected,
considering that both terms were searched in their adjectival forms.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the most frequent collocates before each term
are function words and punctuation. Tables 3 and 4 below illustrate
the order and frequency with which the collocates appear before
each term.
Table 3. Frequent collocates before mobile
Number

Collocate

Frequency

1

A

1273

2

THE

1003

3

AND

553

4

OF

466

5

,

395
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Table 4. Frequent collocates before portable
Number

Collocate

Frequency

1

A

1377

2

THE

485

3

,

355

4

AND

217

5

OF

211

Collocates that appear frequently after each term, however,
demonstrate no overlap. As Table 5 and 6 illustrate, mobile appears
frequently before “phone,” “devices,” “phones,” “home,” and
“homes,” while portable appears before “and,” “phone,” “radio,”
“computer,” and “computers.”
Table 5. Frequent collocates after mobile
Number

Collocate

Frequency

1

PHONE

758

2

DEVICES

626

3

PHONES

583

4

HOME

572

5

HOMES

295

Table 6. Frequent collocates after portable
Number

Collocate

Frequency

1

AND

123

2

PHONE

112

3

RADIO

101

4

COMPUTER

87

5

COMPUTERS

80
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The collocates after each term reveal notable differences
between the two terms. First, portable appears much more
commonly in a list of other adjectives than does mobile, which is
why “and” is portable’s most frequent collocate. These
determinations, along with the findings that portable occurs more
frequently as a post-modifier than mobile, suggest that portable
exhibits behavior that is much more typical of an adjective than
mobile. While no conclusions can be made about the terms’
meanings based on this data, a conclusion can be made that there is
a clear difference in preference for how language users prefer to use
the two terms.
The second difference revealed by the collocates is that,
although each of the collocates could occur with either word, there
is a clear preference for when each term is used. For example,
portable radio or portable computer suggests something slightly
different from mobile radio or mobile computer, as does a portable
home over mobile home. In effect, something that is mobile suggests
that it can move easily (i.e., has wheels or is lightweight), while
portable suggests something can be moved should someone or
something wish to move it (i.e., requires someone to move it). The
difference appears to be something that was made to be moved
easily and often (mobile) versus something that can be moved when
desired but is otherwise stationary (portable).
The results of the comparison of the collocates (displayed in
Figure 1 below) support the above conclusions. The comparison
shows the ratios of the terms when compared to one another and
considers collocates that occur directly before and after the word.
Evidenced in Figure 1, the collocates for mobile include both
animate and inanimate objects, while portable includes only
inanimate objects. Additionally, mobile appears more versatile in its
use because the term suggests movement in more various ways than
portable. For example, mobile can be used to refer to a mobile
person, society, home, clinic, etc.; whereas, portable appears only
to refer to objects that have the option to be moved.
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Figure 1. Comparison (by ratio) of mobile and portable
The results of the comparison support the conclusion that the
definition of mobile refers to an object that can move or be moved,
while the definition of portable refers only to an object that someone
can move. The collocates upwardly and downwardly highlight this
meaning of mobile nicely because both modify the adjective mobile
and suggest directionality. Comparatively, if used with portable
(e.g., upwardly portable), upwardly and downwardly result in an
awkward collocation that is unlikely to occur in natural language
use. This awkward collocation is further supported by the fact that
this combination never occurs in the corpus. Thus, one can conclude
that mobile refers to movement more generally than portable.
Of course, this result does not suggest that mobile and portable
cannot be used interchangeably, but instead suggests that language
users prefer to use the terms in this sense. Likewise, the W2 column
in Figure 1 suggests that users prefer to use these terms differently,
as very little overlap is seen in the collocates of these two terms (the
W2 column displays the ratio of how often the comparative word
occurs with the collocate). In the aggregate, these results suggest
that mobile and portable are in fact not synonymous and suggest a
difference in meaning.
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3. Conclusion
Based on the above results, this Article disagrees with the
court’s decision in Advanced Aerospace Technologies245 to treat the
terms mobile and portable as synonymous, discussed in more detail
below. The corpus plainly demonstrates that language users prefer
to use mobile and portable in different contexts, suggesting nuanced
differences in the meanings of the terms. Specifically, mobile is
more versatile and occurs with animate and inanimate objects, while
portable is used specifically to refer to inanimate objects.
Furthermore, mobile is commonly used to refer to items that can
easily move or be moved (e.g., people, items on wheels, phones);
whereas, portable typically refers to items that must be moved (e.g.,
computers, toilets, CD players). While these terms can be used
interchangeably, the results of the corpus indicate that language
users prefer not to use these terms synonymously. Therefore, this
Article recommends that the terms be considered by the following
definitions:
Mobile: An object, person, or animal that is capable of moving
or being moved. Can easily move from location to location.
Portable: An object that is capable of being moved or designed
to move but may be stationary for long periods of time.
If the dictionary definitions (above)246 are reexamined, the
definitions this Article provided appear only slightly different, but
are different enough to have potentially impacted the Court’s
decision.
D. Specialized Corpus: Advanced Aerospace Technologies v.
United States
Many patent disputes rest on the interpretation of non-technical,
non-scientific terms, but other terms either do not appear in general
corpora or have specific meanings in the patent’s field of
245
Advanced Aerospace Techs., Inc., v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 445, 482
(Fed. Cl. 2015).
246
Supra notes 237–40. See also Mobile, DICTIONARY.COM, https://
www.dictionary.com/browse/mobile?s=t [https://perma.cc/8ZAH-ZBFH] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2021); Portable, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
portable?s=t [https://perma.cc/A28Z-LN3U] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
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inventorship. Even if a term may seem ordinary, courts might be
wary of relying on linguistic data that “may not be written by or for
skilled artisans.”247 Thus, while it has been demonstrated that a
general corpus can be used to uncover the nuanced differences
between similar words and demonstrated the benefits corpora can
offer over a dictionary in providing the general sense of a word
(which is certainly a strength corpora can offer), general corpus is
by no means the most beneficial application of corpora in legal
cases.
The true strength of applying methods from corpus linguistics to
legal cases comes from the fact that specialized corpora can be
created on a case-by-case basis. This specialization is a flexibility
that cannot be offered by catch-all methods such as dictionaries and
general corpora. As each legal case is unique, creating corpora that
can offer specialized definitions of terms will lead to jurisdictions
that are more accurate and fair. Parties may therefore wish to
construct a specialized corpus to overcome these hurdles.
A case where this type of specialized corpus may be useful is
Advanced Aerospace Technologies, Inc. v. United States.248 In that
case, the parties disputed the meaning of the term fixed.249 Advance
Aerospace Technologies, Inc. (“AATI”) obtained a patent on a
launch and recovery system of unmanned aerial vehicles.250 One of
the patent claims included “[a]n unmanned aircraft comprising a
fixed hook located more than half way outboard on a main wing of
said aircraft.”251 AATI argued that fixed required that the hook be
“securely placed or fastened” while the United States and Boeing
advocated for a narrow construction, that the hook be “permanently
attached to the aircraft or flying object.”252 Given that the issue is
centered around the use of a term in a patent pertaining to
aeronautical engineering, understanding how the term is typically

247

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
122 Fed. Cl. 445, 463 (Fed. Cl. 2015).
249
Id. at 464.
250
Id. at 448–49.
251
Id. at 463.
252
Id. at 464.
248
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used in that field would be a fair and unbiased way of determining
which definition should be upheld.
Simply turning to a dictionary in this case would not suffice
because, as demonstrated below, dictionaries provide fairly even
support for both parties’ definitions:
 Google’s definition of fixed: (1) Fastened securely in
position. “a fixed iron ladder down the port side”
(2) (especially of a price, rate, or time) predetermined and
not subject to or able to be changed. “most trusts locked
investors in for a fixed period”253
 Dictionary.com’s definition of fixed: (1) Fastened, attached,
or placed so as to be firm and not readily movable; firmly
implanted; stationary; rigid; (2) definitely and permanently
placed: “a fixed buoy; a fixed line of defense.”254
 Merriam-Webster’s definition of fixed (1) securely placed
or fastened: STATIONARY (2) not subject to change or
fluctuation // “a fixed income”
(3) IMMOBILE, CONCENTRATED // “a fixed stare.”255
Additionally, simply examining the term in a general corpus,
such as COCA, shows that the most common use of the word is
related to finances. A quick search revealed that the five most
common collocates of fixed are effects, rates, income, cost, and
price. Thus, COCA demonstrates that neither of the alleged
definitions in Advanced Aerospace Technologies encompasses the
general sense of the term. While all of the meanings of fixed could
be further analyzed using COCA to determine which of the argued
definitions is more commonly used, this analysis still might not
accurately represent how the term is used in the argued context.
Therefore, this Article’s findings still leave unclear which
definition of fixed—permanent or secure—is the more common in
the context of aeronautical engineering. In order to answer this
253
Fixed, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/XMW3-BVBG]
(search “fixed”) (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
254
Fixed, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fixed?s=t [https://
perma.cc/HT8B-AAYR] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
255
Fixed, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
fixed [https://perma.cc/8EQK-SERL] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
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question, a specialized corpus would need to be created, examining
how the term fixed is most commonly used in the field. Once the
corpus is compiled, the term fixed would be searched in much the
same way as mobile and portable above (i.e., frequency,
distribution, contextual, and collocational data would be examined).
As the field in question is aeronautical engineering, texts that are
representative of published professional texts in aeronautical
engineering would be collected to create a specialized corpus,
Corpus of Aeronautical Engineering (“CAET”).
An ideal corpus would be created based on guidelines from
corpus design experts, Douglas Biber and Jesse Egbert, and thus be
designed to include texts that represent the text varieties that exist in
the population, and decisions about randomness, stratification, and
size would be considered carefully.256 In addition, before running the
final analysis, the corpus would be evaluated for domain and
linguistic representativeness, and changes would be made if
necessary.257 Like the creation of many specialized corpora, the
ability to create a sample that is truly random would be limited by
the practical constraints of time, text availability, and copyright
permissions.258 Thus, the sample would be mostly one of
convenience; however, possible elements of randomness would be
incorporated (i.e., texts would be randomly sampled from the
accessible databases).259
To ensure that the texts are representative of the field of
aeronautical engineering, research into the text types produced by
256

Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, 8 LITERARY &
243, 243–57 (1993); Jesse Egbert, Corpus Design and
Representativeness, in MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS: RESEARCH METHODS
AND CURRENT ISSUES 27, 27–42 (Tony Berber Sardinha & Marcia Veirano Pinto
eds., 2019).
257
Biber, Representatives, supra note 256, at 256 (“[T]he design of a
representative corpus is not truly finalized until the corpus is completed, and
analyses of the parameters of variation are required throughout the process of
corpus development in order to fine-tune the representativeness of the resulting
collection of texts.”). See Egbert, Corpus, supra note 256, at 27–42.
258
See Biber, Representatives, supra note 256, at 243–57; Egbert, Corpus,
supra note 256, at 27–42.
259
See Biber, Representatives, supra note 256, at 243–57; Egbert, Corpus,
supra note 256, at 27–42.
LINGUISTIC COMPUTING
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professional aeronautical engineers would need to be conducted.
Based on this research and consultations with aeronautical
engineering experts, the text types (hereinafter referred to as
“registers”) to be included in the corpus would likely include:
 U.S. patents concerning designs related to “unmanned aerial
vehicle,” “airplane,” or “aircraft” (to be collected from
Google Patents)
 Conference proceedings and abstracts (to be collected from
Engineering Village (Compendex))
 Professional and academic publications (to be collected from
the Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Database
(Proquest), IEEE Xplore, and Engineering Village
(Compendex)
 Aeronautical engineering textbook chapters and book
chapters (to be collected from Knovel and NAU Library)
 Technical reports including design reports, test reports, test
procedures, technical notes, analysis reports, requirements
analysis, and verification documents
 Relevant articles from newspapers, journals, magazines (to
be collected from the Advanced Technologies & Aerospace
Database (Proquest), IEEE Xplore, Engineering Village
(Compendex), and NAU Library Database)
 Aerospace engineering forums and blogs (e.g., Wolfram,
Aerospace Engineering Blog, AIAA, etc.)
As the parties would be interested in determining how the term
fixed is generally used in the field, the corpus would be balanced, so
that the corpus has approximately the same number of texts for each
of the registers named above. Texts would ideally be selected as the
unit of measurement as “texts are naturally occurring, recognizably
self-contained, and functional units of language production and
reception.”260 Texts would be collected in their entirety to ensure
authenticity, which would result in differing numbers of words for
each register; however, this discrepancy is not a major concern as
balance and authentic representation of our target population are the
260

Egbert, Corpus, supra note 256, at 27–42.
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most important factors in accurately determining the definition of
fixed in aeronautical engineering.
Additionally, because the goal would be to determine the
behavior of the term fixed in its natural context, the parties would
need to ensure that the corpus is large enough to get a stable estimate
of the adjective fixed. There is no general consensus on how large a
corpus must be to capture the behavior of a single term, as this is a
fairly nascent area of research; however, Egbert created a formula
that can be used to calculate a recommended sample size a priori by
measuring stability in sample variance.261 Thus, to get an estimate of
variance, one would examine the frequency of the adjective fixed in
the scientific/technical academic section of COCA—the section of
the corpus that is most similar to the CAET—and use the following
formula to calculate the needed sample size:262
𝑠
𝑒 𝑥̅
𝑡
In this formula, n = required sample size, s = estimated standard
deviation for the population, et = tolerable error, equal to ½ the
desired confidence interval (“CI”), x̅ = sample mean, t = t-value for
the desired probability level.263 For these purposes, based on Biber
and Egbert’s recommendation, the tolerable error would be 10% of
the mean score, and the t would be a z-score of 1.96 (which
corresponds to a CI of 95% ).264 See Table 7 below for the estimate
of text numbers to be collected (for each register).
Table 7. Estimated amounts of texts to be collected
Linguistic
Feature

Mean in
COCA

Standard Deviation
in COCA

Tolerable
Error

Required N
(in texts)

Fixed

5.46

8.809

.273

3,999

261

Id.
Id.
263
Id.
264
Biber, Representatives, supra note 256, at 253; Egbert, Corpus, supra note
256, at 27–42.
262
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Based on these calculations, an ideal corpus would need
approximately 3,999 texts to capture the behavior of the term fixed,
which would equate to approximately 571 texts per register. While
this number may seem low, if texts are collected as randomly as
possible and equally within the identified registers, the corpus
should theoretically capture the variation of the term. However, this
calculation is merely a starting point—the corpus would be checked,
and additions would be made if necessary.
Once collected, the texts would be cleaned and converted into
.txt files to ensure that computer-assisted linguistic analyses could
be conducted without issue. The entire corpus would be tagged
using the Biber Tagger,265 so that part of speech can be used to
facilitate the search of the term fixed (which would focus exclusively
on the adjectival form, ensuring that the searches are not convoluted
by the verb form). The texts would then be read into AntConc, a free
concordance software, used to examine concordance lines,
collocates, frequency, and the distribution data of the adjectival use
of the term fixed. As the specialized corpus would be significantly
smaller than COCA, the specialized corpus would likely have the
ability to examine every instance of the term—rather than randomly
sampled lines—to conclude which of the two disputed meanings of
fixed is more commonly used in aeronautical engineering.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are justifiably worried that undue reliance on extrinsic
sources subverts the role of intrinsic evidence, which is the best
evidence to determine the scope of patent claims. Courts
understandably wish to avoid relying on evidence not available to
the public in determining the meaning of patent terms, “thereby
undermining the public notice function of patents.”266 This desire is
especially salient when billions of dollars, the exclusive right to
practice an invention, and the right to fairly compete in the market,
hang in the balance.

265
266

Gray, supra note 210, at 44–45.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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However, corpus linguistics is unlike other extrinsic sources
courts have encountered. This linguistic tool can allow courts to
access information regarding how those skilled in the art would use
technical terms. Thus, by uncovering this skilled usage, courts can
more comfortably determine how a particular term should be
construed. In other words, when the intrinsic evidence does not
clearly demonstrate how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
interpret a patent term, courts can turn to the next best alternative:
discovering—quantitatively—how the majority of persons of
ordinary skill in the art use that term. In this way, methods of claim
construction may more fully support the public notice function of
patents.

